Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2011

Utah Department of Transportation v.FPA WEST
POINT, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a California corporation, BANK OF
AMERICA, NA, fka LaSalle Bank, NA, K MART
Follow
this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
CORPORATION,
a Michigan corporation, and
Part of the Law Commons
NEW
ALBERTSON'S INC., an Ohio corporation
Original
Brief
Submitted
to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
:Library,
Brief
of
Defendant/Appellee
J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR,
may contain
errors.
Utah Court
of Appeals
Nancy L. Kemp; Barbara H. Ochoa; Assistant Attorneys General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Petitioner.
Kenneth A. Okazaki; Bruce Wycoff; Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & Mcdonough, PC; Attorneys for
Defendant/Respondent, FPA West Point LLC. Perrin R. Love; Shannon Zollinger; Clyde, Snow and
Sessions; Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent, Kmart Corporation; Steven E. Tyler; James L.
Barnett; Holland and Hart .
Attorneys for Defendant / Respondent, Bank of America, N.A., as Trustee for the registered holders
of LB-UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2008-C1, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2008-C.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah Department of Transportation v. FPA West Point, LLC, No. 20110354 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2858

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff/ Petitioner
v.
FPA WEST POINT, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company, FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a California corporation,
BANK OF AMERICA, NA, fka LaSalle
Bank, NA, K MART CORPORATION, a
Michigan corporation, and NEW
ALBERTSON'S INC., an Ohio corporation,

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLEE,
FPA WEST POINT, LLC

No. 20110354

Defendants / Respondents
Appeal from Interlocutory Order of the Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley

Kenneth A. Okazaki (#3844)
Bruce Wycoff (#4448)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
McDONOUGH PC
170 South Main #1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)521-3200
Attorneys for Defendant / Respondent, FPA
West Point, LLC
Nancy L. Kemp (#5498)
Barbara H. Ochoa (#4102)
Assistant Utah Attorneys General
Mark L. Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General
rth
160 East 300 South, 5*
Floor
P.O. Box 140858
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858
Attorneys for Plaintiff / Petitioner

PerrinR. Love (#5505)
Shannon Zollinger(# 12724)
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant / Respondent,
Kmart Corporation
(Additional counsel listed on next page)
FILED

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.UTAH APPELLATE
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

COURTS

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff / Petitioner
v.
FPA WEST POINT, LLC, a Delau
limited liability company, FIRST
AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a California corporation,
BANK OF AMERICA, YV fka i aSalit
u ' . X . V K MART CORPORATION
Michigan corporation, and NEW
ALBERTSON'S T>C an Ohio

BRIEF OF DEFEND ANT/APPELLEE,
FPA WEST POINT, I i (

No. 20IKMM

Delendums <. Respondents
Appeal from Interlocutors Order 01 me UUH:JUU;L:
^ah ! ake t ountv. Stale of Utah
i lonoiable Tyrone 1:. Medley

Kenneth A Okazaki (#3844)
Bruce WycotTin4448)
JONrS, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
\\- DONOUGH PC
1/0 vmth Main -:' 1500
Salt Lake City I tah 84101
Telephone (80D 521-3200
Attorneys for Defendant / Respondent, FI'A
West Poini ! i (:
Nancy L. Kemp (#5498)
Barbara H. Ochoa (#4102)
Assistant Utah Attorneys General
Mark L. Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300'South c'h n™r
P.O. Box 1408.58
Salt Lake Citv; Ltah h4114 .i><58
Attorneys for Plaintiff / Petitioner

Perrin R.Love (#5505)
Shannon Zollinger(#12724)
C! M)F SNOW & SESSIONS
201 South Mam Street, 13th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant / Respondent,
Kmart Corporation
(Additional counsel listed on next page)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Steven E.Tyler (#3301)
James L. Barnett (#7462)
HOLLAND & HART LLP
222 South Main, Suite 2200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant / Respondent, Bank
of America, N.A., as Trustee for the
registered holders of LB-UBS Commercial
Mortgage Trust 2008-C1, Commercial
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2008-C 1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED

1

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

1

UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 22

2

UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 78B-6-511

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

II.

3

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT

3

STATEMENTS OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT

5

I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED UTAH CODE ANN.
SECTION 78B-6-511
A.
B.

C

5

UDOT' s APPEAL INVOLVES A QUESTION OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION

6

THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS RELEVANT TO THIS APPEAL

7

SUBSECTION (1) OF SECTION 78B-6-511

8

SUBSECTION (2) OF SECTION 78B-6-511

10

SUBSECTION (3) OF SECTION 78B-6-511

12

SUBSECTION (4) OF SECTION 78B-6-511

13

THE BROWN OPINION

.-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21

H.

HI.

IF BROWN CORRECTLY INTERPRETED IT, UTAH CODE
ANN. SECTION 78B-6-511, THAT READING IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

25

CONCLUSION

26

i

\

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TAIil »:ui

UTTHORITIES

CASES
Big Lost River Irr. Co. v. Davidson, 121 P. 88 (Idaho 1912)

10-12

County v. Boydston, 64 Cal. 110, 29 P. 511 (1883)

19-21

City of Hildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, 28 P.3d 697

11

Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990)

25

Idaho-Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Conference of Evangelical Lutheran Augustana
Synod, 119 P. 60 (Idaho 1911)
15
Kimball v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 253, 90 P. 395 (1907)

24

Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50

24

Milliner v. Government of Virgin Islands, 593 F.2d532 (3rd Cir. 1979)

15

Moschetti v. City of Tucson, 449 P.2d 945 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969), overruled on other
grounds by, City of Tucson v. Rickles, 488 P.2d 180 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971)
14
Rogers v. Wagstaff, 120 Utah 136,232 P.2d 766 (1951)

6

Schwartz v. State, 900 P.2d 939, 942 (Nev. 1995)

13

Sheridan County v. Davis, 240 N.W. 867 (N.D. 1932)

11

State by and through Road Commission v. Brown, 531 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1975)

passim

State By and Through Road Commission v. Papanikolas, 19 Utah 2d 153, 427 P.2d 749,
(1967)
25
State ex rel. Miller v. Filler, 812 P.2d 620 (Ariz. 1991)

14

State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Haapanen, 448 P.2d 703 (Nev. 1968)

15

State ex rel. Moore v. Bastian, 546 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1976)

12

State v. Lewis, 785 P.2d24 (Alaska 1990)

14

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

State v.Petersen, 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991)

24

State v. SecondDist. Court, 36 Utah 396, 104 P. 282 (1909)

6

Town of Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343 (1933)

8-9, 22

Tyson CreekR. Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 174 P. 1004 (Idaho 1918)

15

Utah Dept. ofTransp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 2011 UT 62, 693 Utah Adv. Rep. 16
9,13-14,25
Utah State Road Com 'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984)
Wentzv. Pletka, 108N.W.2d337, 339 (N.D. 1961)
Western Coating, Inc. v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 788 P.2d 503 (Utah 1990)

25
.

15
20

UTAH STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)G) (West 2009)
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511

1
passim

1884 Utah Territory Laws § 1115

17-20
OTHER STATUTES

Alaska Statutes § 09.55.310 (2011)

7

Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-1122 (2011)

7

California Code of Civil Procedure § 1248 (1872)

18-20

Idaho Statutes § 7-711 (2011)

7,12

Nevada Revised Statutes §37-110 (2011)

7,15

<

i

North Dakota Century Code §32-15-22 (2011)

7

28 Virgin Islands Code §419 (2011)

7

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

OTHER AUTHORITIES
29AC.J.S. Eminent Domain § 136(1) (1965)

22-23

29AC.J.S. Eminent Domain § 136(8) (1965)

22-24

29A CJ.S. Eminent Domain § 139 (1965)

23

29A CJ.S. Eminent Domain § 141 (1965)

23

29A CJ.S. Eminent Domain § 178 (1965)

23

29A CJ.S. Eminent Domain § 179 (1965)

23

29A CJ.S. Eminent Domain § 180 (1965)

23

E. H. Turri, Annotation, Are Different Estates or Interests In Real Property Taken Under
Eminent Domain to be Valued Separately, or Is Entire Property to be Valued as a Unit
and The Amount Apportioned Among Separate Interests, 69 A.L.R. 1263 (1930)
21
E. H. Turri, Annotation, Are Different Estates or Interests In Real Property Taken Under
Eminent Domain to be Valued Separately, or Is Entire Property to be Valued as a Unit
and The Amount Apportioned Among Separate Interests, 166 A.L.R. 1263 (1946)
22

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ST AXEMEN

JURISDIC

*- --S "

This Court has ji irisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
section 78A-3-102(3)G) (West 2009).
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTK1)
Whether llu' lollowinp foitntila aennalely refit** Is ttu, pi'ovisions oi Utah Code
Ann section 78B-6-511 applicable to the determination oi' damages resulting from
UDOT's exercise of its eminent domain power in this action:
( l ) T h e value of all estates and interests in, and propei t> on, the pre pei ty
physically taken by UDOT.
To that fixed number is added the total of three other calculations:
(2) Severance damages to the remaining portion of the parcel of whici
physically taken property was a part before its physical taking;

nc

less
(4) The benefit, if any, received by each estate or interest in the remaining parcel
not physically taken that is entitled to compensation under subsection (2);
pla\
(3) Damages, i f any. lo property of which no part is taken;

(7) Assessing each source of damages separately,
' I 'his question is subject to a "correctness" standard of review.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 22:

Private property shall not be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION

78B-6-511 provides, in pertinent part:

The court, jury, or referee shall hear any legal evidence offered by any of
the parties to the proceedings, and determine and assess:
(l)(a) the value of the property sought to be condemned and all
improvements pertaining to the realty;
(b) the value of each and every separate estate or interest in the property;
(c) if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and of each
estate or interest in each shall be separately assessed;
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a
larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff;
(3) if the property, though no part of it is taken, will be damaged by the
construction of the proposed improvement, and the amount of the damages;
(4) separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and each
estate or interest in it, will be benefitted, if at all, by the construction of the
improvement proposed by the plaintiff. If the benefit is equal to the
damages assessed under Subsection (2), the owner of the parcel shall be
allowed no compensation except the value of the portion taken; but if the
benefit is less than the damages assessed, the former shall be deducted from
the latter, and the remainder shall be the only damages allowed in addition
to the value of the portion taken;

<

*

*

# * *

(7) as far as practicable compensation shall be assessed for each source of
damages separately.
I
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^ r v i i i M M N i ni< i n r < \ s i '
I.

NATURE O*
IHE CASE, COURSE
DISPOSITION A T TRIAL COURT

O*

^~~

PROCEEDINGS

AND

This is an eminent domain action, Defendant/Respondent FPA \\c*\ : wn
"I i<T V1) adopts llie case description ill paju" «J "f I'liiuiliff/lVtilioner Utah Dep:it1nient
Transportation's ("UDOT") initial brief
II

STATEMENTS OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED

F P A adopts i ; 5

•>.

| M U ^

! •:

goes, rhere are, ; • • -^ • \ ^! r. ^ '•: • iidi facts relevant 10 the issues before the Court.
The interests of the various parties are: FPA is the fee owner of real property at the
southwest corner >*- Uangerter Highway a™
"Shopping

' '*

^ .r

/

%

(

•>•
-"

; a Special Warranty Deed

from WPS Company ("WPS") dated December 17, 2007 and recorded with the office of
the Salt Lake County Recorder on December 31, 200'

K

)

( o4Jeiciidai]t 1 \i Ra Npuiuiiiil kinail i oipnmlmii i lK msirt") leased lioui I V \
approximately 87,407 square feet of retail space at the Shopping Center. (R. 3, 44 45,
50, r

"4, 88-126, 234, 258A) Co-Defendant/Co-Respondent Bank of America, N.A., as

Trustee ior u-. registered holdei s of I B I IBS Com iiiei cial Moi tgage ' I 'rust 21308 CI,
Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2008-Cl holds a trust deed on
the Shopping Center. (R 4, 151, 306-307)
I JDOl ' has not exercised its eminent domain powei met an\ plnsieal giomid <11improveme ill s R ather, \ JDO I has coi idemned, terminated and closed a direct right of
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access between property that FPA owns, part of which Kmart occupies, on the one hand;
and Bangerter Highway, on the other (the "Right of Access"). (R. 133, 142, 164, 247,
268A) The Right of Access arose in 1995 when WPA deeded property to UDOT for a
widening of Bangerter Highway. (R. 268 A)
UDOT's independent appraisal ("UDOT's Appraisal") characterized the physical
consequences of UDOT's closure of the Right of Access:
The subject has deeded access to and from Bangerter Highway and UDOT
is proposing to acquire the access rights. The access rights were granted as
part of the prior widening of the West Valley Highway (Bangerter
Highway) . . . The proposed acquisition involves no physical taking, only
the taking of deeded access [across property that UDOT has owned since
1975] to and from Bangerter Highway. . . . Physically, the subject is the
same in the after condition as to land area, frontage, shape, and existing
improvements. . . . Physically, the only change to the property is lost
access. Legally, there are no changes.
(R.268A)
UDOT's Appraisal determined that UDOT's closure of the Access Point would
damage FPA in the amount of $1,250,000. (R. 133-134, 151, 271A) This interlocutory
appeal does not involve the correctness of that number. The trial court has stayed further
proceedings below pending the entry of this Court's opinion in this matter. (R. 312)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly concluded that this Court's opinion in State by and
through Road Commission v. Brown, 531 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1975) did not announce a
damages rule consistent with Utah Code Ann. section 78B-6-511.
UDOT's entire argument stems from the faulty premise that subsection (1) of Utah
Code Ann. section 78B-6-511 provides a "limiting function" on damages properly
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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awardable under all subparts of -^v; .

^

•• .-

: ,i,-

.•••.-

: midsection analysis, of all ivlevant provisions of section 78B-6-511 shows that subsection
(1) limits damages only with respect to the property physically taken; and that damages
arising under other subsections of sect ion 78B-6 51 lai e properly assessed separate^
firori it, and without reference to the damages awarded for the value of the property
physically taken under subsection (i). When the Utah Territorial Legislature adopted the
initial version of section 78B-6-° 1 ^ ^
decision of the Calh ••"

-v. •• *

California statute, it also adopted m » :

• •

' =i

l

' ; •- MU: --v:i •*.

If this Court concludes that the Brown decision properly construes section 78B-6511, then section 78B-6-511 is unconstitutional under thi, Court's recent decision in
UtahDept. of 2 ransp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp.,

•

)\ ,|«,!, (V-H Utah \i\\

1 din! this ('omt should then construe Section 78B-6-511 in a way that does not uolaie
the Utah Constitution.
ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION
78B-6-511
A.

UDOT: :' ;

CONSTRUCTION,

AITUAL

l\\ i u \ KS

\

< "
,S i \ 11' 1< m\

H\ spending the time it does defending State by and through Road

Commission v. Brown, 5M I\ Id P.04 (Utah 1<T5\ TTDOT .cans to ask this Court to
treat the issue on appeal as common-law question unn-M:-.

.•. \ • \. utory const! aints.
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See, e.g., UDOT's initial brief at 4: "Brown unequivocally holds that the total value of
the interests cannot exceed the value of the property as a whole."
This case, however, involves the judicial interpretation and application of several
subsections of a statute, Utah Code Ann. section 78B-6-511 Neither UDOT nor FPA
contends those subsections are ambiguous.
Because this appeal involves five subsections of Utah Code Ann. section 78B-6511 (subsections (1), (2), (3), (4) and (7)) (subsection (5) pertains to water and subsection
(6) pertains to crops, and neither is involved in this appeal)), FPA will in this brief use the
defined term "Section 78B-6-511" to collectively refer to subsections (1), (2), (3), (4) and
(7).
When, as here, a Utah court is addressing a statute, the primary rule of
construction is to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the legislature. See, e.g.,
Rogers v. Wagstaff, 120 Utah 136, 140, 232 P.2d 766, 768 (1951); see also State v.
Second Dist. Court, 36 Utah 396, 104 P. 282, 285 (1909) (The duty of courts is to enforce
a statute as written).
Even though the Brown opinion purports to establish the meaning of a statutory
predecessor to Section 78B-6-511, Brown did not identify, much less, analyze the
governing statute.
Any court addressing the statutory dimensions of "just compensation" in Utah
cannot ignore Section 78B-6-511. There are relatively few published Utah decisions on

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Section 78B-6-511 and its predecessors, and only six other jurisdictions have statutes1
that are functionally identical to Section 78B-6-511.

B.

THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED IN THIS APPEAL.

Subsections

1 -4 and 7 of Section 78B-6-511 provide, in pertinent part:
The court, jury, or referee shall hear any legal evidence offered by any of
the parties to the proceedings, and determine and assess:
(l)(a) the value of the property sought to be condemned and all
improvements pertaining to the realty;
(b) the value of each and every separate estate or interest in the property;
(c) if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and of each
estate or interest in each shall be separately assessed;
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a
larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff;
(3) if the property, though no part of it is taken, will be damaged by the
construction of the proposed improvement, and the amount of the damages;
(4) separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and each
estate or interest in it, will be benefitted, if at all, by the construction of the
improvement proposed by the plaintiff. If the benefit is equal to the
damages assessed under Subsection (2), the owner of the parcel shall be
allowed no compensation except the value of the portion taken; but if the
benefit is less than the damages assessed, the former shall be deducted from
the latter, and the remainder shall be the only damages allowed in addition
to the value of the portion taken;...
(7) as far as practicable compensation shall be assessed for each source of
damages separately.
1

Alaska Statutes § 09.55.310 (2011); Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-1122 (2011); Idaho
Statutes §7-711 (2011); Nevada Revised Statutes §37-110 (2011); North Dakota
Century Code § 32-15-22 (2011); and 28 Virgin Islands Code § 419 (2011).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Utah appellate decisions, as supplemented by decisions from other jurisdictions
with statutes functionally identical to Section 78B-6-511, show that the trial court
correctly construed Section 78B-6-511.
SUBSECTION

(1) OF SECTION 78B-6-511.

Of the five relevant subsections of Section 78B-6-511, UDOT acknowledges the
existence of only one, subsection (1). (Because FPA will discuss decisions from other
jurisdictions construing subsection (1) of their functionally identical statutes, FPA refers
to all such statutes generically as "Subsection (1)"). This Court addressed Subsection (1)
in Town of Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343, 347 (1933), a case involving just
compensation due for the condemnation of ditches.
UDOT attempts to distinguish Thomas by arguing that it applied only subpart (b)
of Subsection 1 (characterizing Thomas as addressing "the lump-sum valuation of
multiple, individually-owned parcels"). See UDOT's initial brief at 4, 10. By its terms,
however, subpart (b) deals with multiple interests in the property physically taken, not
with takings of multiple separately owned parcels. Subpart (c) deals with the situation in
Thomas: the physical taking from multiple owners.
The critical point, however, is not whether one or another subpart of Subsection 1
applies. The critical point is that all three subparts of Subsection (1) describe damage to
u

the property sought to be condemned" and to estates and interests in that property.

Subsection (1) has nothing to do the effect of the physical taking on remaining property
or with severance damages or the statutory offset for benefits to the remaining property.
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FPA shows below that Subsections (2), (3), (4), and (7) separately address damage
calculations for property not physically taken, but damaged, by the physical taking.
The Thomas claimants asserted claims under Subsection (1) resulting from the
physical taking, and claims for severance damages under one of the other subsections of
Section 78B-6-511.

See id. at 344.

The Thomas opinion identified the separate

compensation procedure for these two different claims and the role of subsection (7):
"[E]ach owner is entitled to have separately assessed [1] the value of the land in separate
ownership and each estate or interest therein [Subsection 1,] and also [2] damages to the
remainder of the tract when a part only is taken [Subsection 2]." See id. at 347.
In its discussion of Thomas UDOT never acknowledges the existence of the
severance damages issue in Thomas or the subsections in Section 78B-6-511 that
addresses those differences.
Only one month ago, after UDOT filed its initial brief, this Court recognized this
interaction of the various subsections of Section 78B-6-511
[W]hen a landowner has only a portion of his land taken, the landowner is
entitled to (1) the value of the property taken and (2) severance
compensation for the damages that "accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned and the construction of the improvement." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-6-511 (2) (2008).
Utah Dept. ofTransp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 2011 UT 62, ^ 32, 693 Utah Adv. Rep.
1.
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

n

Supreme courts in the other states sharing the Utah statutory scheme describe the
process similarly. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court provided a more detailed
explanation:
This section of the statute [Subsection (1)] names the different elements of
compensation to which the owner of land is entitled where his land, or any
part of it, is sought to be taken for a public use. . . . [T]he form of verdict
of the jury should show the finding upon each of these elements of damages
described in this section. That is: First, the value of the property sought to
be condemned and all improvements thereon pertaining to the realty, and of
each and every separate estate or interest therein, and if it consists of
different parcels, the value of each parcel and each estate therein shall be
assessed; second, if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a
part of a larger parcel, the jury must also find the damages which will
accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason of the
severance from the portion sought to be condemned; and, third, if the
property sought to be condemned constitutes a part of a larger parcel, the
benefits that will accrue to the remaining portion after the severance of the
part condemned
Big Lost River Irr. Co, v. Davidson, 121 P. 88, 91-92 (Idaho 1912)
In its initial brief UDOT addresses only Subsection (1) and invites the court to
assume that only Subsection (1) is involved in this appeal. Although Subsection (1) is
important in ways that UDOT does not address, and which FPA will address later in this
brief, the assumption that UDOT urges on the Court is incorrect. The appeal in fact
i

involves four additional subsections: (2), (3), (4) and (7).
SUBSECTION

(2) OF SECTION 78B-6-511

Subsection (2) provides the formula for the award of severance damages incurred
by the owner of property that the taking caused to be severed from the physically taken
property. Again, because FPA will discuss decisions from other jurisdictions construing
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subsection (2) of their functionally identical statutes, FPA refers to all such statutes
genetically as "Subsection (2)").
This Court has defined statutory severance damages as those that "occur where a
partial taking to a parcel of land causes harm to the portion of the property not
condemned." City ofHildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56, f 3, n.l, 28 P.3d 697.
The North Dakota Supreme Court explained how Subsection (1) relates to
Subsections (2) and (3): "D]amages recoverable consist of [1] the value of the right
condemned and [2] of the incidental damages to the freehold and [3] to the land not
directly affected by the right condemned." Sheridan County v. Davis, 240 N.W. 867, 870
(N.D. 1932)
In Sheridan County, the court directed the jury to determine the severance
damages accruing to the portion of the land not sought to be taken, and to consider the
benefits, if any, to such land (subsection (4) of Section 78B-6-511), and then to add those
damages, if any, to "the reasonable market value of the portion and parcel of land
actually taken and occupied and appropriated for the purpose of the gravel pit in
question". Id. at 870-71. Although the court reversed the trial court on the measure of
damages for the properly taken (subsection 1), it affirmed the trial court's conclusion that
the proper value of the property taken is added to severance damages incurred under
subsection (2) after deducting from those severance damages any benefit to the remaining
property (subsection (4) of Section 78B-6-511).
The Idaho Supreme Court similarly construed the functionally identical Idaho
statute in the same way: After separately finding and assessing "the value of the property
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sought to be condemned and all improvements thereon" in one number in its jury verdict
form, the jury is then to make two additional findings and assessments in separate juryverdict entries if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger
parcel. The jury must also assess and enter on the jury verdict form the damages which
will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason of the severance from
the portion sought to be condemned. In addition, the jury must separately assess and
enter on the jury verdict form the benefits that will accrue to the remaining portion after
the severance of the part condemned. See Big Lost River Irr. Co., 121 P. at 91-92.
The Idaho Supreme Court later applied Idaho Statutes § 7-711 to the damages
suffered by a landowner and a lessee due a road widening. In explaining the measure of
damages, the court remanded with instructions that on remand the jury "must arrive at a
total award of damages to the real property and thereafter apportion such damages
between" the lessor and the lessee. The apportionment was not of the value of the
property to the condemning authority. Rather, the apportionment was of the damages
that the lessor and the lessee could separately prove. See State ex rel Moore v. Bastian,
546 P.2d 399, 405 (Idaho 1976)
SUBSECTION

(3) OF SECTION 78B-6-511

Subsection (3) provides the formula by which holders of other "estates" or
"interests" damaged as a result of UDOT's closure of the Right of Access. The language
of subsection (3) appears only in the Nevada, North Dakota, and Utah Statutes.
The Nevada Supreme Court explained the self-evident operation of the subsection
(3) language: u[T]his provision applies to situations where physical damage has occurred
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to property as a result of construction of an improvement or where a property right which
is directly connected to the use or ownership of the property is substantially impaired or
extinguished." Schwartz v. State, 900 P.2d 939, 942 (Nev. 1995)
Whereas subsection (3) applies to land that was never a part of the physically
taken property, Subsection (1) applies only to property that was physically taken. By
definition, subsection (3) damages cannot be included in the Subsection (1) calculation as
UDOT argues.
SUBSECTION

(4) OF SECTION 78B-6-511

Subsection (4) reduces a severed property owner's severance damages under
Subsection (2) in the case of a partial taking to ensure that that owner does not obtain a
windfall.

Once again, because FPA will discuss decisions from other jurisdictions

construing subsection (4) of their functionally identical statutes, FPA refers to all such
statutes generically as "Subsection (4)")
This Court recently explained the operation of Subsection (4): "In cases where the
remainder property will be benefitted by the construction of the improvement, the statute
requires that the amount of the benefit must be subtracted from the severance
compensation. Id. § 78B-6-511(4)." Admiral Beverage, 2011 UT 62, f 32, 693 Utah
Adv. Rep. 1. Thus, Admiral Beverage establishes that by its terms, subsection (4) applies
only to severance damages, not to Subsection (1) damages resulting from the physical
taking.
Although Admiral Beverage resolves this issue as a matter of Utah law, decisions
from other jurisdictions with functionally identical statutes uniformly read Subsection (4)
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as this Court has in Admiral Beverage.
In Alaska,
[t]he measure of severance damages is the difference between the fair
market value of the remaining property before and after the partial taking.
In calculating the amount of severance damages, the condemnor is entitled
to an offset of damages to the extent that the proposed public improvements
confer a special benefit on the remaining property.
State v. Lewis, 785 P.2d 24, 27 (Alaska 1990) (emphasis added) (citation omitted)
In Arizona, "Severance damages, the second element in the just compensation
formula, are offset by any special benefits the remaining property receives because of the
proposed improvement,. . ." State ex rel Miller v. Filler, 812 P.2d 620, 623 (Ariz. 1991)
(emphasis added); see also Moschetti v. City of Tucson, 449 P.2d 945, 951 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1969) ("In a jurisdiction enforcing this standard, it is inescapable that the benefit
conferred upon the remaining land by the improvements contemplated will reduce
severance damage") (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds by, City of Tucson v.
Rickles, 488 P.2d 180 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971)
In Idaho:
[U]nder the laws of this state three facts are to be determined in a
condemnation suit where it is not sought to take the entire tract of land but
only a portion thereof: First, the value of the property sought to be
condemned together with all the improvements thereon pertaining to the
realty; second, if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a
part of the larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the remaining
portion by reason of the severance must be assessed; and, third, if the
property sought to be condemned constitutes a part of a larger parcel, the
benefits which will accrue to the remaining portion after the severance of
the part condemned must be ascertained and assessed and be deducted from
the damages that will be sustained by the severance. Our statute, therefore,
provides not only for the assessment of damages for the value of the
property taken, but, in addition thereto, provides for the assessment of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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damages and benefits sustained and received by the remaining parcel of
land after the severance, and which is caused "by reason of its severance
from the property sought to be condemned" and the "construction of the
improvement proposed" by the condemnor.
Idaho-Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Conference of Evangelical Lutheran Augustana
Synod, 119 P. 60 (Idaho 1911); see also, Tyson Creek R. Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 174 P.
1004 (Idaho 1918) ("benefits which will specially and directly accrue to the portion of the
land not sought to be condemned may be set off against the damages which will accrue to
the portion not sought to be condemned, but not against the value of the portion of the
land taken.") (emphasis added).
In Nevada, "NRS 37.110(4) requires that benefits accruing to the remaining
property are deductible from the severance damages."

State ex rel. Department of

Highways v. Haapanen, 448 P.2d 703, 704 (Nev. 1968) (emphasis added).
In North Dakota, benefits are offset only against "the portion not sought to be
condemned". Wentz v. Pletka, 108 N.W.2d 337, 339 (N.D. 1961)
And, in the Virgin Islands:
In the case of a partial taking, an award of just compensation is to consist of
[1] the value of the portion of the property condemned plus [2] an
assessment of the damages, [3] offset by any benefits, which will accrue to
the portion not condemned by reason of the severance. Moreover, the
statute requires that "(a)s far as practicable compensation shall be assessed
for each source of damage separately."
Milliner v. Government of Virgin Islands, 593 F.2d 532, 535 (3rd Cir., 1979) (applying
Virgin Islands law) (emphasis added).
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Thus, an examination of its separate elements shows that Section 78B-6-511
establishes a simple, clear and straightforward

formula for determining "just

compensation" in Utah:
(1) The value of all estates and interests in, and property on, the property
physically taken by UDOT.
To that fixed number is added the total of three other calculations:
(2) Severance damages to the remaining portion of the parcel of which the
physically taken property was a part before its physical taking;
less
(4) The benefit, if any, received by each estate or interest in the remaining parcel
not physically taken that is entitled to compensation under subsection (2);
plus
(3) Damages, if any, to property of which no part is taken;
by
(7) Assessing each source of damages separately.
At pages 7-8 of its initial brief, UDOT argues this cannot be right: "If the value of
the property as a whole served no limiting function, there would be no need to determine
it. . . . If each estate or interest were entitled to be valued without reference to gross
value of the parcel giving rise to it, there would be no need to separately value each
underlying parcel."
UDOT is correct that Subsection (1) is there for a purpose. UDOT is wrong,
however, in its explanation of what the purpose of Subsection (1) is. To understand that
purpose, it is necessary to refer to the history of the predecessor of Section 78B-6-511.
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THE HISTORY OF SECTION

78B-6-511. The Utah Territorial Legislature enacted

the initial version of what is now Section 78B-6-511 in 1884 as section 1115 of the 1884
Utah Territory Laws ("Section 1115"). As initially adopted in 1884, Section 1115 read:
SEC. 1115 The Court, jury, or referee must hear such legal testimony as
may be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must
ascertain and assess:
1.
The value of the property sought to be condemned, and all
improvements thereon pertaining to the realty, and of each and every
separate estate or interest therein; if it consists of different parcels, the value
of each parcel and each estate or interest therein shall be separately
assessed;
2.
If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a
large parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned, and the construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff;
3.
Separately how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and
each estate or interest therein, will be benefited, if at all, by the construction
of the improvement proposed by the plaintiff; and if the benefit shall be
equal to the damages assessed, under Subdivision 2, the owner of the parcel
shall be allowed no compensation except the value of the portion taken; but
if the benefit shall be less than the damages so assessed, the former shall be
deducted from the latter, and the remainder shall be the only damages
allowed in addition to the value;
4.
If the property sought to be condemned be for a railroad the cost of
good and sufficient fences along the line of such railroad between such
railroad, and other adjoining lands of the defendant;
5.
As far as practicable, compensation must be assessed for each source of
damages separately.
When it adopted Section 1115 in 1884, the Utah Territorial Legislature adopted an
existing California Statute verbatim (except for subsection (4) dealing with condemnation
for railroads, which has no application to this appeal).
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In 1884, when the Utah Territorial Legislature adopted it, that California statute
read:
The Court, jury, or referee must hear such legal testimony as may be offered
by any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and
assess:
1.
The value of the property sought to be condemned, and all
improvements thereon pertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate
estate or interest therein; if it consists of different parcels, the value of each
parcel and each estate or interest therein shall be separately assessed;
2.
If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a
larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned, and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed
by the plaintiff;
3.
Separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and
each estate or interest therein, will be benefited, if at all, by the construction
of the improvement proposed by the plaintiff; and if the benefit will be equal
to the damages assessed, under Subdivision 2, the owner of the parcel shall be
allowed no compensation except the value of the portion taken; but if the
benefit shall be less than the damages so assessed, the former shall be
deducted from the latter, and the remainder shall be the only damages allowed
in addition to the value;
4.
If the property sought to be condemned be for a railroad, the cost of
good and sufficient fences along the line of such railroad, and the cost of
cattle guards where fences may cross the line of such railroad;
5.
As far as practicable, compensation must be assessed for each source
of damage separately.
California Code of Civil Procedure § 1248 (1872).
In an opinion issued only the year before Utah adopted California Code of Civil
Procedure section 1248 as Section 1115, the California Supreme Court explained the
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interrelationship between the various provisions of California Code of Civil Procedure
section 1248 ("Section 1248").
First, the trier of fact must separately "ascertain and assess":
(1) the value of the land sought to be condemned, and of any improvements
upon it at the date of the issuance of the summons in the proceeding; (2) the
damages which may accrue to the remaining land by reason of its severance
from the part sought to be condemned, and the opening of the road in the
manner proposed by the plaintiff; and (3) the benefit, if any, which the
opening of the road may be to those portions of the defendant's land which
may be severed from the part to be appropriated.
Butte County v. Boydston, 64 Cal. 110, 29 P. 511, 511 (1883) (emphasis added).
These three calculations are "the elements of the compensation to which an owner
of land is entitled, where his land, or any part of it, is proposed to be taken and
appropriated for a public use." Id.
Only after establishing these three separate elements does the trier of fact then
apply the benefit offset contained in subsections (3) of Section 1115 and 1248:
When these things shall have been judicially ascertained and assessed, if
the benefit shall be less than the damage, the former must be deducted from
the latter, and the remainder shall be the damages assessed. On the other
hand, if the benefit shall exceed or be equal to the damage, the owner shall
be entitled only to the value of the land to be taken. But the value of the
land, the damage, if any, and the benefit, if any, must be separately
assessed, in order that the compensation may be adjudged and paid.
Id. at 111-12 (emphasis added).
The Butte County opinion thus makes clear that the calculation in Subsection (1) is
a minimum amount, or floor, that the owner of the physically condemned property
receives irrespective of any benefit that a condemnation might confer on the remaining
property. The sole function of subsection (1) is to calculate and isolate that minimum
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amount, or floor, that the owner of the physically taken property receives for the property
that he has lost to the condemnor.
After explaining the proper analysis under Section 1248, the Butte County Court
vacated the trial court's award because it failed to follow this procedure:
The [trial] court held, as a conclusion of law, that that portion of
defendant's land sought to be condemned was necessary for the road, and
that it should be condemned upon payment to the defendant of $150, each
party paying his own costs. It is stipulated that this sum of $150 was found
as damages; but whether the sum was for the value of the land to be
appropriated to the road, or for damage for any injury to the remaining
land, or for the excess of damage over benefit, nowhere appears in the
findings or by an assessment. The defendant was entitled to have his
compensation ascertained and assessed according to law, and for that
purpose the mode designated by the law must be pursued. Without an
assessment, as far as practicable, for each source of damage separately, and
without payment or tender of the compensation assessed, no judgment of
condemnation could be legally entered.
M a t 112.
Thus, under at the time that the Utah Territorial Legislature enacted Section 1115
in 1884, the California Supreme Court had already established that under California Code
of Civil Procedure section 1248 severance damages and any offsetting benefit are
calculated without reference to Subsection (1) damages awarded for the loss of the
physically taken property.
This court has recognized that when the Utah Legislature adopts a statute from
another state, a presumption arises that the Utah Legislature is familiar with that other
state's judicial interpretations of the borrowed statute and intends to adopt those judicial
interpretations along with the borrowed statute. See, e.g., Western Coating, Inc. v.
Gibbons & Reed Co., 788 P.2d 503, 506 (Utah 1990).
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Especially in a case such as this where the Utah Legislature adopted a statute over
125 years ago, this is a sound principle, and if it has not already done so, this Court
should expressly adopt the Butte County reading of California Code of Civil Procedure
1248 as prior controlling law concerning the comparable provisions of Section 78B-6511(2011).
However, it appears that this Court has already adopted the reasoning of Butte
County:
In cases where the remainder property will be benefitted by the construction
of the improvement, the statute requires that the amount of the benefit must
be subtractedyrom the severance compensation. Id. § 78B-6-511(4)
Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 2011 UT 62, f 32, 693 Utah
Adv. Rep. 1 (emphasis added).
C.

T H E BROWN OPINION.

The Brown opinion performs none of this analysis.

In fact, the Brown opinion does not as much as identify the statute that applies.
Instead, the Brown court relied on an AMERICAN LAW REPORTS annotation, E. H.
Turri, Annotation, Are Different Estates or Interests In Real Property Taken Under
Eminent Domain to be Valued Separately, or Is Entire Property to be Valued as a Unit
and The Amount Apportioned Among Separate Interests, 69 A.L.R. 1263 (1930). The
Brown opinion did not even acknowledge that seventeen years after the 1930 annotation,
the ALR publishers supplemented the 1930 annotation with a new annotation, E. H.
Turri, Annotation, Are Different Estates or Interests In Real Property Taken Under
Eminent Domain to be Valued Separately, or Is Entire Property to be Valued as a Unit
and The Amount Apportioned Among Separate Interests, 166 A.L.R. 1263 (1946) The
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1946 Annotation - published and available throughout for almost three decades before
the Brown opinion - made clear that the very authority Brown cited for the general rule
had analyzed an earlier Utah Supreme Court decision, Thomas, and a predecessor statute
to Section 78B-6-611, and had determined that its general rule had no application in
Utah:
The [general] rule [is] that where there are several interests or estates in a
parcel of real estate taken by eminent domain, a proper method of fixing the
value of each interest or estate is to determine the value of the property as a
whole, and then apportion the same among the several owners according to
their respective interests or estates, rather than to take each interest or estate
as a unit and fix the value thereof separately,...
# # #

There are, however, decisions in which it has been held that, pursuant to
express statutory provisions, the value of each separate interest or estate in
land should be separately assessed rather than be computed in a lump sum
to be apportioned among the various owners according to their respective
interests or estates. . . . [I]n Perry v. Thomas (1933) 82 Utah 159, 22 P2d
343, the court, in holding that the condemned land was not properly
described in the condemnor's complaint, pointed out that under the Utah
statute each owner is entitled to have separately assessed the value of the
land in separate ownership and each estate or interest therein.
M a t 1212.
The Brown opinion identified one additional authority: 29A C.J.S. Eminent
Domain § 136(8). See id. at 1295 n.l.
At the time of the February 14, 1975 issuance of the Brown opinion, the 1965
edition of CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, as supplemented, was the version available to the
Brown court. The subsection that the Brown court cited, 136(8), is part of a larger section
entitled "General Principles". 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain subsection 136(1), the first
subsection in section 136, begins:
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The measure of damages when any particular piece of property is taken for
public use under the power of eminent domain is just compensation. The
measure and elements of such compensation are not fixed by any hard and
fast rule, but depend largely on the nature and extent of the right taken or
the interest acquired, as well as on the resulting injury or benefit to the
owner of the property affected, and the determination of such questions is
for the courts and not the legislature or an administrative agency of the
government. A statute specifying a formula for determination of the
compensation to be paid and does not prevent the parties from agreeing on
a lesser sum.
Broadly speaking, the amount of compensation awarded should be
measured by the owner's loss, and not by what the taker has gained, and
should be such as fairly and fully to indemnify the owner for the damage
sustained by him. In other words, the owner is entitled to the full and
perfect equivalent in money for the property taken, and he is to be put in as
good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken, but he
cannot receive more than just compensation or indemnity for his loss.
29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain section 136(1) (1965)
The careful examination of the C.J.S. subsection that the Brown court cited,
section 136(8), shows that it deals with the Subsection (1) issue of valuing the property
taken, and not with severance damages, damages to property not taken, benefit and other
issues raised in Subsections (2), (3), and (4). In 1975 there were other C.J.S sections
dealing with those considerations. See, e.g., 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain (1965) §§ 139
("Where Part of Tract Is Taken"), 141 ("Where Property Injured but No Part Taken"),
178 ("Set-Off against Value of Part Taken or from Entire Compensation"), 179 ("Set-Off
against Damages for Residue"), and 180 ("Set-off against Damages to Separate Tract").
And, there is nothing controversial about C.J.S. Eminent Domain section 136(8)
when viewed in this light. It merely says that for purposes of the property actually taken
(the Subsection (1) calculation), the value of the various estates or interest in the property
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physically taken cannot exceed the value of the property physically taken itself. As
shown above, courts construing Subsection (1) have made that same point.

The

discussion in 29A CJ.S. Eminent Domain section 136(8) has nothing to do with
severance damages, damages to property not taken, benefit and other issues addressed in
Subsections (2), (3), and (4) of Section 78B-6-511, all of which UDOT ignores in its
initial brief.
This court has indicated that no court has the discretion to misapply a statute. Cf.
State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991). The court has no discretion other than
to apply the clear terms of any statute at issue.
Finally, to the extent this Court concludes that Section 78B-6-511 contains an
ambiguity, it has it recently reiterated that because the exercise of eminent domain results
in the derogation of a property owner's right to use and enjoy his land, any ambiguity in
statutory language purporting to grant the power of eminent domain must be strictly
construed in favor of the property owner and against the condemning party. See Marion
Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch Pyship, 2011 UT 50, If 16 & n.15.
For all these reasons, Brown announced an incorrect legal rule. This court has
observed that "[t]he adherence to precedent is no doubt a commendable judicial virtue,
but, if carried to extremes, may easily, like most virtues, border upon vice. The law as
declared by the courts should not be permitted to prevail against valid statutory
enactments,..." Kimball v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 253, 90 P. 395, 396 (1907).
For all these reasons, Brown is a quaint and meaningless legal relic having no
precedential or analytical value. The trial court properly discounted Brown and its
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announced rule because that rule is inconsistent with the relevant provisions of Section
78B-6-511.
II.
IF BROWN CORRECTLY INTERPRETED IT, UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION
78B-6-511 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution of Utah provides: "Private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." Section 78B-6511 "implements" this constitutional provision.

See State By and Through Road

Commission v. Papanikolas, 19 Utah 2d 153, 427 P.2d 749, 154 (1967). Because Section
78B-6-511 merely implements the Constitution, Section 78B-6-511 cannot restrict
constitutional rights, that are "self-executing".

Article I, Section 22 is such a self-

executing constitutional provision and the Utah Legislature cannot abridge through
legislation rights that the constitutional provision establishes. See generally, Colman v.
Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990).
This Court earlier made clear that the measure of damages described in the Brown
opinion is contrary to the requirements of the Utah Constitution:
Article I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[p]rivate property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."
The constitutional requirement of just compensation derives as much
content from the basic equitable principles of fairness as it does from
technical concepts of property law, when the State takes private property
for the public welfare. For compensation to be fair and just, it must reflect
the fair value of the land to the landowner. "Just compensation means that
the owners must be put in as good a position money wise as they would
have occupied had their property not been taken." State v. Noble, 6 Utah 2d
40,43, 305 P.2d 495,497 (1956)
Utah State Road Com 'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 828 (Utah 1984) (citation omitted)
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More recently in paragraph 28 of its Admiral Beverage opinion, this court
explained why Section 78B-6-511 would violate Article I, Section 22 if Brown was
correct about the statute's meaning and effect, and the Court should construe Section
78B-6-511 in a way that does not violate the Utah Constitution.
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons this Court should affirm the judgment of the trial
court in all respects.
DATED: November 23, 2011
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